CIPSEC will be at IEEE TrustComm'18

Tuesday, July 31, 2018
(New York , USA)

CIPSEC will be at TrustCom-18 (The 17th IEEE International Conference On Trust, Security And Privacy In Computing And Communications) represented by University of Darmstadt (TUD)

The 17th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (IEEE TrustCom-18) will be held in New York, USA from July 31th - August 3rd, 2018. The conference aims at bringing together researchers and practitioners in the world working on trusted computing and communications, with regard to trust, security, privacy, reliability, dependability, survivability, availability, and fault tolerance aspects of computer systems and networks, and providing a forum to present and discuss emerging ideas and trends in this highly challenging research field.

Researches from TUD (Hatem Ismail, Stefanie Roos and Neeraj Suri) are authors of the paper "A Composite Malicious Peer Eviction Mechanism for Super-P2P Systems" accepted to be presented at this conference.

Large-scale P2P applications that host millions of users increasingly rely upon semi-structured super-P2P systems to provide efficient services in dynamic environments. Given the critical role of ‘super peers’ in such topologies, attackers specifically target super peers due to the resultant high damage on P2P services.

In this paper, we consider the prominent class of Outgoing Eclipse Attacks (OEA) where an attacker aims to block the communication by controlling all the outgoing connections of honest super peers. Our interest on OEA stems from the fact that our simulation studies reveal that OEAs can cause up to 90% of all service requests to fail. Our attack mitigation relies upon a novel (a) monitoring and (b) malicious peer eviction scheme based on a composite proactive and reactive mechanism. Our proactive mechanism enforces an upper bound on the number of connections an attacker can establish, whereas our reactive mechanism expels malicious peers from the overlay using a distributed consensus protocol. We show that our protection mechanism is highly effective and exhibits a low false-positive rate. Our extensive simulation study validates the analytical results over a large range of parameters with observed detection accuracies of 99% and throughput enhancements of up to 100% while entailing an overhead of less than 5%.